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COPYRIGHT OF ADVERTISING
MAnY GARnm BORDEN*

Undoubtedly advertising is taking its place in the realm
of "big business". It has now become an integral part of our
commercial system, as a necessary adjunct to production and
distribution. The amount expended for advertising runs well
into the millions of dollars yearly, and we are daily confronted
with the evidence of this enormous expenditure in newspapers
and magazines, car cards and billboards, and of course on the
radio. The slogans of advertisers have become a part of our
daily conversation, and the characters depicted in series of advertisements have become as familiar as the daily comics. It is the
purpose of this paper to discuss the protection offered the "idea
men" behind each advertising campaign, the writers of advertising copy, and the commercial artists and photographers, under
copyright law.
The idea of a propery right in a literary work is not new
but dates from the invention of printing around 1472. As writings began to gain widespread circulation, the need arose for
protection from unauthorized copying. At first, however, protection after publication was given only to printers and booksellers, and not to authors. The property right of an author in
his writings was first recognized in 1709 with the passage in
England of the Statute of Anne, which was the foundation of
our present copyright system. Successive statutes extended the
term "author" to include the artist, the photographer, and the
composer of music. The idea of copyright as it then stood in
England was embodied in the Constitution of the United States,
which provides in Article 1, Section 8: "The Congress shall
have the power ... to promote the progress of science and the
useful arts, by securing, for a limited time to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries."
Advertising was slow to take its place as one of the "useful
arts" referred to in the Constitution. For instance, in 1880
copyright was denied a paint advertisement, consisting of a
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card of sample colors and lettering, because the Court felt that
the exclusive right to an advertisement could not be acquired.1
As late as 1922 this attitude toward advertising was reflected in
a dissenting opinion, in which the judge expressed his desire
to dismiss the whole matter before the Court as no more than
"a trivial pother between advertisers ' 2 and "essentially no
more than an advertising row of no importance.'' 3 This historical reluctance to recognize a property right in advertisements
has probably been due to the fact that the gigantic industry
concerned with the formulation and dissemination of advertising is of very modern origin. There was little need for protection of an advertisement as a literary or artistic creation in
the days when no great value was placed upon it by the creator.
Though his property right existed, theft of this property did
not even approach petty larceny, and was understandably beneath the concern of the law.
By 1903, however, the situation had changed sufficiently to
permit advertising to enter the realm of useful arts. It is interesting to note that the first case in which an advertisement was
4
afforded copyright protection had to do with a circus poster.
The poster was held to be a proper subject of copyright on the
ground that it was a pictorial illustration. In an opinion by
Justice Holmes, the Supreme Court said: "A picture is none
the less a picture and none the less a subject of copyright that
it is used for an advertisement. "3 Following this decision copyright protection was afforded to a periodical publication illustrating dress fashions,6 and to a catalogue containing illustrations of statuary for sale.7 Successive cases well illustrate the
extent to which the Courts have gone in literal interpretation of
the famous statement of Justice Holmes to the effect that "It
would be a dangerous undertaldng for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of
pictorial illustrations, outside the narrowest and most obvious
1

Ehret v. Pierce, 10 Fed. 553 (1880).
2 Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co.,
281 Fed. 83, 95 (1922).
^Id. at 97.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U. S. 239 (1903).
rId. at 251.
'National Cloak and Suit Co. v. Kaufman, 189 Fed. 215 (1911).
1
Da Prato Statuary Co. v. Guiliani Statuary Co., 189 Fed. 90
(1911).
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limits.' ' In the light of this view, the classification "pictorial
illustrations" has been broadened to include pictures of brass
trimmings for electric light fixtures, 9 chromes or lithographs of
vegetables, 10 and pictures of orthopedic devices. 1 ' There is
little doubt that the pictures of noted artists such as Grant
Wood, Rockwell Kent, Vertes, or Salvadore Dali appearing in
advertisements today are as fully protected under copyright law
as are the pictures of less slillful commercial artists and of
photographers.
Thus we see that commercial art was brought within the
purview of the Constitution, but there remains the problem
of copyright protection for the format of an advertisement. None
of the earlier cases gave any rights at all in the words used,
their particular arrangement, or the size and color of the type.
It was not until 1932 that recognition was given to the property rights of the authors of advertising copy in the products
of their efforts. In the case of Ansehl v. PuritanPharmaceutiat
(i."' the plaintiff sued for infringement of his copyrighted advertisement of cosmetics. It was a full page spread in a newspaper, containing a picture of various products manufactured
by the plaintiff, and a coupon which entitled the reader to take
advantage of a "special offer" described in the written portion.
The advertisement of the defendant was similar in all respects,
with the exception of the difference in the brand of cosmetics
pictured in the illustration, and slight paraphrasing of the words
in plaintiff's ad; the arrangement, the size type, and the idea of
a "special offer", complete with coupon, were the same. The
court upheld plaintiff's exclusive right to the layout of his advertisement under the copyright law, and enjoined infringement by the defendant. The test for infringement was laid
down, as dicta, in an earlier case,1 3 where the court said that
there would be infringement if "the advertisements of the defendant company were so similar in appearance and wording
'Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U. S. 239, 251
(1903).
White Manufacturing Co. v. Shapiro, 227 Fed. 957 (1915).
"Stecher Lithographing Co. v. Dunston Lithographing Co., 233
Fed. 601 (1916).
Campbell v. Wireback, 269 Fed. 372 (1920).
361 F. 2d 131 (1932).
'"International Heating Co. v. Oliver Oil Gas Burner and Machine Co., 288 Fed. 708 (1923).
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to plaintiff's that the ordinary person reading those of the defendant would be deceived and believe that he was reading the
advertisements of the plaintiff."14
Ample protection is afforded under copyright law, as we
have seen, to the illustrations of commercial artists and the
copy of advertising writers. The same protection is not afforded
the "idea men" who conceive the basic plans behind each largescale advertising scheme. It is a well-established principle that
ideas as such cannot be the subject of copyright. 15 The tangible
expression of the idea, such as a book or a picture, may be
copyrighted, but the copyright protection does not extend to the
basic idea explained or portrayed therein. This principle is
illustrated by the case involving the "bank night" scheme of
motion picture advertisement. 16 The originator of the scheme
copyrighted the advertisements and the explanatory literature
which he sold to movie houses. The Court refused relief for
infringement of copyright against one who merely copied the
basic idea of the scheme, without directly copying the advertisements or the literature. There seems to be sound reason for
this distinction. Ideas are intangible things; more than one person may have the same idea, and until it is in tangible form it
is impossible to determine with any certainty just which person
conceived the idea first. Then, too, there is the public interest
involved. In the case of advertising ideas, the reason is not so
clear as in the casq of a mathematical system, or a chemical
process, for example. In the latter instances it is clear that the
progress of scientific advancement might be seriously impeded
if scientific knowledge could be bought and sold like peanuts
or apartment buildings. So is there public interest involved in
the case of advertising schemes. Every man, be he scientist or
advertising man, should be free to think as he pleases, and it is
only when those thoughts- are embodied into some product of his
labor, or the labor of others that a property right should arise,
and then only in the product and not in the thoughts. The only
real protection a man may afford his ideas is to keep them to
14Id at 711.
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880); Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet.
591 (U.S. 1834); Christianson v. West Publishing Co., 149 F. 2d 202
(1945); Kaesner and Blair v. Merchants' Ass'n., 64 F. 2d 575 (1933);
Haskins v. Ryan, 71 N. J. Eq. 575, 64 Atl. 436 (1906); Downes v.
Culbertson, 153 Misc. 14, 275 N. Y. S. 233 (1934).
1 Affiliated Enterprises v. Gruber, 86 F. 2d 958 (1936).
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himself until he is ready to put them to use in some tangible
form. Once disclosed, all legal rights in the idea are lost, and
17
no statutory protection is afforded by copyright law.
However, there are two instances, outside the realm of copyright, in which protection has been afforded to an idea after
disclosure. One means is to protect the idea by contract. The
originator of an idea may agree to disclose it for a price, and
if the contract of sale has been completed and the idea disclosed,
the seller must pay the agreed price. In one case the Court went
so far as to find an implied contract, arising from the conduct
of the parties.' s In that case an advertising scheme consisting
of a slogan and suggested illustrations was submitted to a tobacco company. The Court found that there was no actual
acceptance of the offer, but the tobacco company later used substantially the same idea in their advertising. The originator of
the idea collected $9,000 from the tobacco company. The Court
said that his idea was novel and new and that it was embodied in
concrete form. There seems to be little distinction between the
idea embodied in the bank night case and the idea contained in
the advertising scheme in this case. The difference probably lies
in the relation of the parties, upon which relation has arisen
another basis for protection afforded ideas outside the realm of
copyright.
In the case of Intervational News Service v. Associated
Press,19 protection was given to one news service against pirating
of their uncopyrighted news items by another news service, on
the basis of unfair competition. The reasoning was based on the
"free ride" doctrine, that one should not be allowed to reap
where he has not sown. The crux of the case, however, lay in
the relation of the parties, as competitors in the same field of
endeavor. A later case 20 refused to apply the "free ride" doctrine to the case of news pirated from one of the news services
by a radio station, on the grounds that the newspapers and the
radio station were not in competition with one another. It may
be that this decision in the news service case is peculiarly ap'TBristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of U. S., 132 N. Y. 264,
30 N. E. 506 (1892); Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 43 F. 2d 685 (1930).
" Liggett and Meyer Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 194 N.E. 206 (Ind.
App. 1935).
1248 U.S. 215 (1918).
'Associated Press v. KVOS, 80 F. 2d 575 (1935).
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plicable to that type of business and would not apply to other
businesses. Later decisions on similar fact situations indicate
the reluctance to apply the "free ride" doctrine to other fields
of endeavor. 2 1 In the case of Grant v. Kellogg Co.,22 for instance,
an artist was hired to make advertising drawings for Rice
Krispies cereal. He conceived some distinctive gnomes named
"Snap", "Crackle", and "Pop", which were used in all the
pictures drawn to advertise the breakfast cereal. After some
disagreement with the Kellogg Co., another artist was hired to
draw the gnomes for the advertising, and the original artist sued
for infringement of the distinctive characters. Relief was refused, on the ground that the artist had no property right in
the idea or conception but only in the executed pictures. It
would seem that the relation of the parties here would be sufficiently close to find some breach of trust, but the "free ride"
doctrine was not applied. A different result was reached in the
case of King Features Syndicate v. Fleischej,-2 3 which did not
involve advertising ideas. In that case the plaintiff copyrighted
a book of cartoons, picturing a character called Barney Google
and his horse Spark Plug. The defendant manufactured a toy
horse, copied from plaintiff's picture of Spark Plug, and advertised the toy under the name "Spark Plug" or "Sparky".
Plaintiff was granted relief for infringement of his copyright.
The Court said: "The artist's concept of humor was embodied in
the copyrightable form ...; its essence was the concept of humor
which that form embodied.' '24 A like result was reached in the
case of Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Freuwndliclk, 11c., 2 5 which involved the infringement of plaintiff's copyrighted cartoon
"Betty Boop" by a doll bearing the same name. There seems to
be no apparent reason for the distinction between ideas embodied in comic strip characters and ideas embodied in advertisements, except for the historical reluctance to recognize property rights in advertising.
In radio the problem of advertising is somewhat different.
As far as the sponsor is concerned, the program which he presents for the entertainment or edification of the listening public
' 1 Meyer v. Hurwitz, 5 F. 2d 370 (1925).
2 58 Fed. Supp. 48 (1944).
-'299Fed. 533 (1924).
21Id. at 538.
2 5 Fed. Supp. 808 (1924), aff. 72 F. 2d 276.
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is as much a part of his advertising as the commercials which
go along with it. The program and the commercials stand in
much the same relation as the picture and the reading matter
on a billboard, and are likewise difficult to consider separately.
In addition, radio commercials are of such ephemeral nature
that they require little protection. Even though it might be
considered desirable it is doubtful that a valid copyright could
be secured for radio commercials in any case. In the Copyright
Act of 1909, as amended in 1912 (17 U.S.C.A.), it is provided,
in Section 9: "That any person entitled thereto by this Act may
secure copyright for his work by putblication thereof with the
notice of copyright required by this Act ...

"

It has been

held that radio production of original scripts does not constitute
publication, and that the author has not lost any common law
copyright which he may have in such material by its use on the
air.'-'"
In that case, however, the commedian Ed Wynn was enjoined from publishing scripts which he wrote for the Texaco
radio show, even though he retained his common law copyright
in them after broadcast. The decision was based on unfair competition. Use of advertising matter on the radio is analogous
to the use of dramatic material or comedy dialogue, and its use
probably would not constitute publication under the requirements of the Copyright Law. Thus it would be fully protected
by common law copyright against copying or pirating.
Today advertising is given limited but probably adequate
protection under the laws of copyright. Necessary supplemental
relief is often granted in an action based on contract or on unfair competition. The fact remains, however, that copyright protection is not often sought for advertisements. In a recent issue
of Good Housekeeping magazine, for example, only 24 out of a
total of 366 ads appearing in the issue were copyrighted. Apparently imitation is not considered a formidable threat nor a
serious offense, but may actually result in more good than harm
to the originator. The old adage, "Imitation is the sincerest
form of flattery" seems to apply particularly in the field of advertising.

-Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 81 F. 2d 373 (1936).
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